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cific limitations, it should be remembered that
the lessee has the right to locate wells and
equipment as he may reasonably determine
necessary.
Lessors who own property subject to an ag-
ricultural lease or which holds the promise of
lignite mining should also be concerned about
the possible conflict between the rights granted
under an oil and gas lease and rights previously
granted or that may be granted under other
leases. A broadly worded warranty clause in
any of the leases might cause the lessor to be
dragged into a fight between the various lease
holders. One way of circumventing such poten-
tial problems is to provide that any right
granted to the oil and gas lessee are to be exer-
cised in a manner which will not unnecessarily
interfere with other operations "which may
then or in the future be conducted on the
premises."
A Mother Hubbard clause, sometimes called
a cover-all clause, is a phrase at the end of the
granting clause that typically provides that "this
lease also covers and includes any and all land
owned or claimed by the lessor adjacent or con-
tiguous to the land described hereinabove..."
The Mother Hubbard clause is designed to pro-
tect the lessee against the inadequate legal de-
scription. However, the typical formulation of
the Mother Hubbard clause is so broadly drafted
that it could include lands of the lessor that the
lessor had no intention of leasing. Therefore,
the Mother Hubbard clause should be deleted by
the landowner's attorney.
It is preferable to use a full legal description
in the lease granting clause, though "bounded
by" descriptions identifying the land by refer-
ence to the ownership of surrounding tracts are
sometimes seen. The lessor's attorney may
want to limit the granting with a depth limita-
tion, effectively reserving to the lessor the
rights to depths deeper than those tested by
wells drilled on the premises. With luck, the un-
leased depths can be the subject of further nego-
tiations at a later date.
The Habendum Clause
The habendum clause states the period of
time for which the lease will extend. Typically,
it provides for a stated number of years of a
primary term-during which the lessee need
do nothing so long as delay rentals are paid-
and a secondary term which will last as long as
oil and gas are being produced or operations are
conducted on the lease.
The length of the primary term is negoti-
able. In general, a short primary term is better for
the lessor than a long primary term, however.
There is virtual unanimity from the courts
that the term "production" as used in the
secondary term provisions requires production
"in paying quantities." Furthermore, most
states require that there be actual production
which is marketed in order to extend the lease.
These interpretations are generally an adequate
protection for the lessor's interest.
The Royalty Clause
The lessor's royalty is a percentage share of
production, free of the expenses of production.
Typically, royalty clauses provide for a "stan-
dard" one-eighth as the landowner's share. In
fact, you can often do better for your clients.
In addition to the percentage of royalty,
there are other important considerations to the
landowner's bottom line that should be consid-
ered by his attorney.
Courts in many states have held that the
lessor must bear his proportionate share of
costs subsequent to production, such as costs of
compressing, transporting, and dehydrating
the natural gas. Those decisions often lead to
dispute between the landowners and oil com-
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tial facilities claim are (i) whether the facility is
so essential in conducting a particular business
that a party deprived access would be placed at
a severe competitive disadvantage, and (ii)
whether it would be economically impractical
for the person seeking access to duplicate the
facility. It is expected that this area of the law,
insofar as it applies to the natural gas industry,
will develop rapidly as direct federal regulation
is phased out of various areas of the industry.
The current gas bubble has presented
new challenges to producers seeking a
market for their natural gas. The ex-
isting regulatory framework provides
several means by which producers can market
their natural gas production directly to the end
users. Nevertheless, this framework remains
complex and many potential direct sale transac-
tions may not be economically feasible unless
the sale and transportation arrangements can be
structured to avoid the major administrative
hurdles. However, given the proper structuring
MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tele- of such transactions, the direct producer sale
phone & Telegraph Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. can be a very attractive arrangement for both
1983). The key issues in establishing an essen- producer and end user.
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The secondary term of the lease gives the
oil company the right to the property as long as
it is profitable to produce. Under no circum-
stances should an oil company accept a fixed-
term lease. It is clear that a lease will terminate
at the end of a fixed term, even though it is still
producing prolifically.
The term production, as it is used in the
term clause, generally is interpreted to require
merely that operating revenues exceed operat-
ing costs over an economically significant time
period. Occasionally, however, the lessor will
propose to modify a term clause to define pro-
duction in terms of an average daily, monthly,
or annual production, e.g., "production shall
be considered to be in paying quantities so long
as the proceeds of oil and gas production shall
total at least $25,000 each calendar year."
Whether that is acceptable will depend upon (a)
the amount of production required, (b) the ex-
pected production decline curve, (c) the suscep-
tibility of production to interruption, and (d)
how badly your client wants the lease.
Around the turn of the century the courts
held that, because the primary consideration
for the grant of an oil and gas lease was the ex-
pectation of the parties that production would
be obtained on the lease, there was a promise
implied when the lessee accepted the lease that
it would develop the premises within a reason-
able period of time. Recognition of the implied
covenant to test undercut the first important
goal of the lessee in the lease; it imposed an obli-
gation to drill.
The Delay Rental Clause
The implied covenant to test was countered
by the oil industry by inserting a delay rental
clause in the lease. The clause specifically dis-
claims any obligation to test the premises during
the primary term. Because of this specific provi-
sion, there can be no implied covenant to test.
Typically, leases are drafted so that failure
to pay rentals properly is a special limitation to 55
the lease primary term and the lease terminates
"unless" delay rentals are paid. In order to be
properly paid, delay rentals must be paid (a) to
the proper persons, (b) on or before the due
date, (c) in at least the amount provided for, and
(d) in the manner provided for. Under "unless"
lease forms, failure to comply with all of these
tests will cause automatic lease termination.
Lease prices have increased so dramatically
over the last ten years that some lease draftsmen
have altered the delay rental provisions to try to
avoid automatic termination in the event of im-
proper payment. One way is to convert the pay-
ment of rentals from a special limitation to a
promise; the lessee promises to pay rentals or
commence drilling operations. Under the "or"
form of delay rental clause, often seen in
California and Appalachia, the result of im-
proper payment is liability for the rental pro-
mised rather than automatic termination.
Another approach is to retain the usual
"unless" language but modify it with savings
language providing that termination will not
take place if an attempt is made to make proper
payment. Such language was recently held ef-
fective in Kincaid v. Gulf Oil Corp., 675
S.W.2d 250 (Tex. App. 1984).
S ome mineral owners object to "or"
leases or rental savings clauses. They
are unrealistic. Quite simply, it makes
no business sense for an oil company
to pay hundreds of thousands or even millions
of dollars to acquire a lease that will auto-
matically terminate if a mistake is made in pay-
ment of a few hundreds of dollars in delay rent-
als. The attorney representing an oil company
in negotiating leases should insist that his client
be protected.
Another alternative to the traditional "un-
less" lease is the paid-up lease. A paid-up lease
does not provide for payment of delay rentals;
they are "paid up" in advance. Negotiation of
paid-up leases is growing in favor among oil
companies, because they avoid the risk of inad-
vertent loss inherent in "unless" leases. How-
ever, creating a paid-up lease can be difficult.
It is preferable to use a form drafted specifi-
cally as a paid-up lease. However, if it is neces-
sary to modify an "unless" form, do not just
cross out the drilling-delay rental clause. That
may cause ambiguity as to your client's right to
hold the lease by payment of shut-in royalties, if
the shut-in payment is related to the delay rental
amount. Better practice is to complete the delay
rental clause, and then note elsewhere in the
lease that it is paid up, and that there is no obli-
gation to pay rentals or drill during the primary
term.
Defensive Clauses
As I have noted, all modern-day oil and gas
leases include defensive clauses to protect the
lessee against premature termination for fail-
ure to obtain actual production by the end of the
primary term. Defensive clauses include (1) the
operations clause, (2) the force majeure clause,
(3) the shut-in royalty clause, and (4) pooling
and unitization clauses. Negotiation of altera-
tions to these clauses can be disastrous.
Because most major oil-producing states
require actual production and marketing to ex-
tend the lease into the secondary term, almost
all modern-day oil and gas leases include an
operations clause, which specifically provides
that commencement of operations on the prem-
ises will extend the lease so long as they con-
tinue, even without production.
One alteration occasionally negotiated by
mineral owners is a provision that the lease will
terminate unless a well is "completed" by the
end of the term. That should be unacceptable to
the oil company, because there are myriad rea-
sons that it may not be possible to complete a
well before the end of the term. There is some
confusion as to what "completion" means, but
it probably requires only that a well be ready to
produce. In contrast, the term "commence-
ment," requires only that there be some activ-
ity on the land directly related or preparatory to
drilling, done in good faith and diligently pur-
sued.
Less troublesome, at least if your oil com-
pany client understands its requirements, is a
provision that permits the lease to be held by
operations, but defines operations in a restric-
tive way, e.g., "actual drilling operations" re-
quires that a drilling bit actually bite into the
earth by the end of the primary term.
The purpose of the force majeure clause in
the modern-day oil and gas lease is to protect
the lessee against loss of the lease in a situation
in which a "superior force" beyond his control
prevents actual production.
Force majeure is a term that does not have
a clearly defined meaning. Therefore, the
courts look to the language of theforce majeure
clause to determine what kinds of events will
permit extension of the lease. Recent events
have shown the importance of force majeure
language that specifically refers to market con-
ditions or regulatory action as force majeure
occurrences that will excuse actual production.
However, many forms omit one or the other. In56
addition, some have argued that lessors ought
not to agree to regulation as a soure offorce ma-
jeure. See Houston and Merrill, A Suggested Oil
and GasLease Form, 43 NEB. L. REV. 471 (1964).
Lessors do not often attempt to negotiate
modifications of force majeure clauses. Per-
haps the greatest damage to the industry is self-
inflicted, through the selection of lease forms
with narrowforce majeure provisions. For ex-
ample, it is important that the force majeure
clause interrelate with the operations clause to
excuse a failure to conduct drilling operations
as well as a failure to produce in the event of
force majeure. If that is not done, the lease will
terminate if unusual weather conditions or
other force majeure events prevent the con-
duct of drilling operations.
The shut-in royalty clause is included in the
oil and gas lease to provide for constructive pro-
duction in the event that wells on the lease are
shut in. It is not an essential defensive clause in
those few states, like Oklahoma, where a mere
capability of production is sufficient to extend
the lease into the secondary term. However, in
most states, where the lease will terminate at
the end of the primary term unless there is ac-
tual production, the shut-in royalty clause is an
absolute must, for without it the lessee may lose
a proven lease and a well capable of producing
profitably. Yet, there are forms currently avail-
able that do not contain a shut-in royalty clause.
In recent years, negotiators for lessors have
frequently sought to modify shut-in royalty
clauses. Their attempts have taken at least three
different directions.
Typically, printed form leases provide for
shut-in royalties to be paid in an amount equal
to the delay rentals agreed upon, which is usual-
ly a nominal one dollar per acre. Lessors' nego-
tiators sometimes insist upon divorcing the
amount of shut-in royalties from the amount of
delay rentals to impose an economic penalty
upon the lessee when wells are shut in, e.g.,
shut-in royalties of $20 per acre covered by the
lease. If the price is not too high, this modifica-
tion is acceptable, though it complicates lease
adminstration.
Lessors have also negotiated to limit the
circumstances under which the shut-in clause
can be invoked. For example, the shut-in clause
may be modified so that the only circumstances
in which the well may be shut in and the lease
preserved under the shut-in clause is where
there is a lack of market for the gas. That is too
restrictive, for there may be man, legitimate
reasons for shutting in a well.
The most dangerous of common alterations
to the shut-in royalty clause is a time limitation,
e.g., "Notwithstanding anything to the con-
trary herein contained this lease may not be
maintained by the payment of shut-in royalties
and without actual production for more than
two years after the end of the primary term."
Many lessees agreed to such time limits in leases
negotiated in the 1970s. They could not con-
ceive of a time when gas wells would be shut in
for more than two years. They were wrong, and
some will lose their leases in the 1980s as a re-
sult.
Pooling and Unitization Clauses
Pooling and unitization clauses in the mod-
ern-day oil and gas lease serve two functions,
both of which are related to the fundamental
purpose of the lease. First, they give the lessee
the flexibility to extend several leases into the
secondary term by the drilling of a single well.
Such clauses typically provide that:
Operations for drilling on or production of
oil and gas from any part of the pooled unit com-
posed in whole or in part of the land covered by
this lease ... shall be treated for all purposes ex-
cept the payment of royalties on production
from the pooled unit as if the same were included
in this lease.
Second, pooling and unitization clauses may be
used by the lessee to expedite secondary
recovery operations, which will increase the
profitability of the leases as well as extend
them.
Many lessors take a jaundiced view of pool-
ing clauses, and there is some basis for their con-
cern. The courts have consistently held that the
burden is upon the lessor to show a breach of
good faith for the lessee's use of a pooling or
unitization clause.
In recent years, some lessors have sought to
delete the pooling clause. In a state like Okla-
homa, where compulsory pooling or unitiza-
tion by conservation agency decree is readily
available, this may be tolerable. However, it is
not desirable because it limits the lessee's flexi-
bility. In a state like Texas, it is simply unwork-
able, because it is difficult to qualify for forced
pooling under Texas statutes, and that a friend-
ly lessor may not be so friendly when asked to
sign a voluntary pooling agreement.
One alteration to the pooling clause of an
oil and gas lease that may be acceptable to your
oil company client is a Pugh clause, sometimes
called a Freestone rider. These clauses modify
the usual form of a pooling clause by severing
producing and nonproducing portions of the
lease:
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary 57
herein contained, drilling operations on or pro-
duction from a pooled unit or units established
under the provisions of [the pooling clause]
hereof or otherwise embracing land covered
hereby and other land shall maintain this lease in
force only as to the land included in such unit or
units.
The effect of the Pugh clause or Freestone rider
is to limit the lessee's ability to hold the lease
premises without actually drilling every part of
it.
A variation of the Pugh clause goes further.
This is the "vertical" Pugh clause:
Notwithstanding any other provisions here-
in contained, after the expiration of the primary
term hereof production from the leased prem-
ises shall maintain this lease in force only above a
depth of 100 feet below the deepest well then
producing in paying quantities on the leased
premises ....
An even more extreme formulation will limit
the lease to the wells or formations actually pro-
ducing. While a lessee can probably live with
some form of a vertical Pugh clause, they should
be avoided.
Royalty Clause Alterations
The royalty clause is the main lease provi-
sion for compensation of the lessor. Therefore,
oil companies should be particularly sensitive
to its terms.
Until the mid-1970s, the oil and gas lease
royalty was more or less fixed by custom at one-
eighth, except in California, where it was gen-
erally one-sixth. That custom is a victim of ris-
ing oil prices. Today, lease royalty is whatever
is negotiated by the parties. Royalty fractions
range from one-eighth to one-third.
Royalty provisions may be modified in
more subtle ways, however. These modifica-
tions may be of greater importance to ultimate
profitability than the percentage royalty pro-
vided for.
In cases in Texas, Kansas, Montana, and
Mississippi, courts have held that a gas royalty
clause calling for royalties to be calculated on
the "market value at the well," refers to market
value when the gas is delivered, rather than to
the contract price for which it is sold, less costs
subsequent to production. Accordingly, some
lessors have begun negotiating for market value
gas royalty clauses in their leases. These are to
be avoided, if at all possible, because they may
subject the oil company to royalty liability far in
excess of that anticipated when the lease is
taken. Ironically, many printed form leases in-
advertently give the lessor a market value royal-
ty clause.
Delays in the payment of royalties have be-
come an increasing concern to lessors. There-
fore, some lessors have negotiated for clauses
that will permit them to declare the lease forfeit
if royalties are not paid on a timely basis.
Though forfeiture clauses will be strictly con-
strued by the courts, they should not be agreed
to by lessees. The risk of inadvertent loss of the
lease is too great.
A more reasonable negotiated provision,
now imposed by statute in several states (in-
cluding Texas and Oklahoma), is payment of in-
terest on royalties not paid on a timely basis. I
think that such provisions are hard to argue
against; if you hold another's money, you ought
to pay interest on it unless you place it in escrow
or trust.
It is easy for even experienced oilmen to
miss the forest because of all the trees that get in
the way in lease negotiations. The business de-
cisions are for your oil company client, of
course. However, the natural resources lawyer
can help his or her clients taking leases by coun-
seling them upon the purpose and structure of
the basic clauses so that negotiated changes in a
printed form do not interfere with the basic
purposes of the lease.
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panies over what costs are properly deductible
and how they should be calculated. Such dis-
putes can be avoided by the landowner's attor-
ney by providing in an addendum to the lease
that the lessor's royalty is not to be charged
either directly or indirectly with such expenses.
I use the following formulation: "expenses of
production, gathering, dehydration, compres-
sion, transportation, manufacturing, process-
ing, treating, or marketing of gas, oil, or any
liquefiable hydrocarbon extracted therefrom."
Typically, royalty provisions for gas re-
quire the lessee to pay the lessor the royalty per-
centage calculated on the amount realized by
the lessee, computed at the mouth of the well.
Such language does not protect the lessor's in-
terest adequately if the market price for gas in
the area increases faster than the price set under58
the contract negotiated by the lessee. When I
can, I delete the references in the royalty clause
to the "amount realized," substitute a reference
to "market value," and add a clause similar to
the following:
For the purpose of computing royalty under the
terms of this lease due and payable on the pro-
duction of gas or casinghead gas which may be
produced from or attributable to this lease, the
market value of the gas or casinghead gas, if ap-
plicable, produced from or attributable to the
lease premises shall be the contract price receiv-
ed by lessee. If lessee shall by contract sell or
otherwise dispose of gas or casinghead gas
which may be produced from or may be attribut-
able to this lease to any parent, subsidiary, or af-
filiate or lessee, through stock ownership, joint
operation or otherwise, for the purpose of com-
puting royalty during the period of such con-
tract, the market value of the gas or casinghead
gas, as applicable, produced from or attributable
to the lease premises shall be the higher of the
contract price received by lessee or the average
of the three highest prices paid for gas or cas-
inghead gas of like quality, quantity, vintage, and
federal classification produced from any field
located in Texas within a 50-mile radius of the
leased premises and sold under a sales contract
having a term of not less than three (3) years.
Royalty on oil is usually payable in kind.
This gives the landowner the right to make his
own arrangements for sale. Often, leases permit
the lessee an option to purchase oil at the mar-
ket price prevailing in the field where pro-
duced. It is a good idea to strike such language
to preserve the lessor's flexibility to bargain.
It may also be desirable for the lessor to re-
tain the right to take his royalty share of gas in
kind. It may be easier for the lessor to make his
own arrangements for sale than to argue with
the lessee about what is a "fair" price and what
costs, if any, are properly deductible from the
royalty share. This can be accomplished by an
addendum to the lease that the lessor has the
right at any time and from time to time to take in
kind his royalty share of gas produced, upon
ninety-days' notice to the lessee. The language
should specifically state that lessee does not
have the right to sell or commit the royalty
share of gas without prior written consent of
the lessor.
A frequent source of concern and aggrava-
tion for the lessor is the lessee's failure to pay
royalty promptly. One way to minimize such a
problem is for the landowner's attorney to ne-
gotiate a forfeiture provision. I suggest the
following:
If lessee shall fail or refuse to make the payment
of any sum due by the provisions of the lease as roy-
alty on the production within three (3) months after
same shall become due, this lease may be subject to
forfeiture by lessor by notice given in writing to
lessee at the address provided by the lessee. Such
notice shall recite the fact constituting the default and
the forfeiture.
Recently, the Texas legislature enacted Title
3, Chapter 91, Subchapter K, Payment for Pro-
ceeds of Sale, which provides that the proceeds
from the sale of oil or gas production from an oil
or gas well must be paid within 120 days after
the end of the month of the first purchase.
Thereafter, payments must be made according
to the frequency of payments specified in the
lease or division order between the payor and
the payee. The law requires that if a payment is
not made as required, the payor must pay inter-
est to a payee at the rate charged on loans to
depository institutions by the New York Fed-
eral Reserve Bank, unless the parties have
agreed otherwise. Such statutes, which have
now been enacted in several states, should mini-
mize the instances of slow pay.
Shut-In Well Clause
The shut-in well clause typically appears as
a part of the royalty clause. Generally, it is ap-
plicable to gas only and it provides that a lessee
may hold a lease even though there is no pro-
duction from it, when there is a gas well on the
premises that is shut in and a shut-in royalty is
paid. The purpose of the shut-in clause origin-
ally was to allow a lessee a chance to obtain a
reasonable market for the gas. However, as
typically drafted, the language is vague to allow
the lessee the sole discretion whether to shut in
a well and to permit the lessee to hold the lease
for years simply by paying a nominal shut-in
royalty. I like to limit the shut-in clause to a rea-
sonable period of time, for example, two years.
Pooling and Unitization
Clause
The pooling and unitization clause is in-
cluded in the oil and gas lease to give the lessee
the possibility to conform its operations on the
surface to the geological facts of the under-
ground formations. However, the language of
the clause is too broad from the viewpoint of
the lessor.
Pooling and unitization clauses typically
give the lessee the right to pool and unitize a
tract of land without any consultation with the
lessor. A lessee might extend a lease without
drilling on the leased land merely by including
small portions of the leased premises in a unit 59
where drilling or production is occurring. Be-
cause of the potential abuse of the powers of the
clause, it is preferable from the landowner's
point of view that his consent be required for
the establishment of units on a case-by-case
basis.
Most pooling and unitization clauses also
provide that drilling operations on or produc-
tion from a pooled unit will maintain the lease
as to those portions of the leasehold tract
located outside the unit. Under such a formula-
tion, it is theoretically possible for a lease cov-
ering 100 acres to be maintained as to all 100
acres, from the surface to the center of the
earth, by the inclusion of only one acre from the
tract in a shallow drilling unit. A Pugh clause or,
it is called in Texas, a Freestone rider, may be
added as a rider to the lease to preclude this pos-
sibility. Such clauses modify the pooling clause
to provide that only the portion of the lease in-
cluded in the unit will be maintained by unit
operation.
Delay Rental and Partial
Release Clause
The delay rental clause allows the lessee to
defer commencement of drilling operations
during the primary term by paying delay rentals
to the lessor. Typically, delay rental clauses are
of the unless type, and failure to pay or tender
rentals on a timely basis will terminate the lease
in its entirety. However, in recent years, many
oil companies have started using lease forms
that contain savings clauses that provide that
the lease will not automatically terminate for
failure to pay delay rentals. Obviously, such
clauses are contrary to the lessor's interests and
expectations, and they should be struck when
encountered.
In addition, the delay rental clause often
gives the lessee the right to release all or any
portion of the leased premises, while maintain-
ing the lease upon the balance. Since the release
of portions of the leased premises may reduce
your client's expected income, you may decide




Though the courts in most states have inter-
preted the term production that is used in the
habendum clause as requiring actual produc-
tion in marketing and paying quantities, most
oil and gas leases change this rule so that opera-
tions anywhere on the land begun within the
primary term will maintain the lease so long as
they are continued. I do not object to such a pro-
vision, for my client's interest lies in produc-
tion being obtained. However, printed form
Producers 88 leases often contain language that
attempts to limit what would otherwise be the
lessee's obligation to protect the premises by
operations, which should always be unaccept-
able to the landowner's attorney. For example,
leases in Texas frequently contain the following
language:
In the event of a well or wells producing oil
and gas in paying quantities should be brought in
on adjacent land and within three hundred thirty
(330) feet of and draining the lease, or acreage
pooled therewith lessee agrees to drill such off-
set wells as a reasonably prudent operator would
drill under the same or similar circumstances.
Though that language may appear to your lessor
client to be giving him something, its effect is to
exclude any obligation to protect the premises
from drainage by operations more than 330 feet
away.
The Assignment Clause
Oil and gas lease printed forms generally
give the lessee the specific right to assign his
leasehold interest. Your lessor client may want
to protect himself from having to accept a debtor
whose solvency and reputation are question-
able. Frequently, lessors would not grant a lease
were they not under the impression that a par-
ticular company would develop the property.
It is simple to modify the lease to provide
that the lessee may not assign its interest with-
out the lessor's approval. On the other hand, a
lessor should also realize that certain types of
assignments are necessary to finance oil and gas
exploration. It may be that it would be suffi-
cient for the lessor's interest to modify the lease
to require that the lessee furnish notice that the
lease is being assigned to a third party. Notice
keeps the lessor informed of the current lessee
with whom he must deal.
Warranty Clause
I automatically strike the warranty of title
from every printed form lease presented to my
clients. The warranty clause of the oil and gas
lease obligates the lessor to defend title to the
property lease if it is questioned. The lessor
could incur substantial legal expenses in the
event of such title disputes. Unless the lessor
has a recent and extensive title examination60
showing good titles, he is ill advised to give a
warranty.
Deletion of the warranty clause may not
fully protect a lessor from liability associated
with failure of title. That is because several
states have found that an implied warranty is
created by the use of "grant, lease, and let" in
the granting clause. Therefore, I prefer a rider
paragraph expressly disclaiming any warranty
of title.
Force Majeure
The force majeure clause is included in an
oil and gas lease to preserve the lease when the
lessee, because of superior force beyond its
control, is unable to produce or operate. How-
ever, frequently force majeure clauses seek to
excuse the lessee when there is a scarcity of
equipment or failure of carriers to transport or
furnish facilities for transportation. This sort of
formulation goes far beyond the legal theory of
force majeure and should be struck. Force ma-
jeure should exclude that which human pru-
dence could either foresee or prevent.
If a lessor's bargaining leverage allows
more demanding concessions to be rung out of a
lessee, then I suggest a modifiedforce majeure
provision. I sometimes insert a paragraph that
limits the duration of any excused delay in per-
formance to two years, limits the effect of the
delay to the leased acreage specifically affected
by force majeure, and provides for rental pay-
ments during the excused period.
A judicial tendency toward strict inter-
pretation of lease provisions against
the lessee has resulted in the evolu-
tion of printed forms that tend to
favor the lessee. Since most printed forms are
lessee's forms, such forms must be closely ex-
amined by a lessor prior to execution. As a prac-
tical matter, there is little possibility that any
lessee will acquiesce to all of the recommenda-
tions suggested herein. Accordingly, a lessor
will need to inventory and identify his primary
interests, concerns and needs; furthermore, a
lessor will then need to assign priorities to his
concerns so as to further identify his hard bar-
gaining issues and his concessionary issues.
Should negotiations on several of the sug-
gested recommendations fail, the debate con-
cerning such issues may, nevertheless, disclose
to the lessor the true intent and character of the
potential lessee, revealing potential problem
areas before the ink of a lessor's signature has
dried on the dotted line.
The oil and gas lease is a complex docu-
ment but flexible enough to be tailored for par-
ticular needs. Be careful, concise, and to the
point when changing or adding language,
otherwise the ambiguity may be self-defeating
should a court of law be unable to decide its
meaning.
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off-system customers, on a non-arbitrary basis.
The term non-arbitrary is chosen advisedly,
because the Commission probably cannot man-
date that pipelines render open, nondiscrim-
inatory transportation services to all who re-
quest them, as end users and others have urged.
There may occasionally be legitimate reasons
for limiting access to transportation services. In
recognition of the more compelling of these,
the Commission might permit pipelines to make
the availability of transportation dependent
upon other factors, such as take-or-pay conces-
sions on the part of producers who seek to have
their gas transported or satisfaction of some
minimum purchase quantity standard by
distributors wishing to have gas transported. If
pipelines are not permitted to employ such cri-
teria in offering transportation services, they
will be forced to bear alone the risks of market
loss and supply-demand imbalance that are
properly shared by all sectors of the natural gas
industry.
To ensure a more equitable division of the
risks of marketability and supply sufficiency,
the Commission should look favorably upon
proposals to trade a pipeline's willingness to
make transportation services more widely
available for a provision permitting the collec-
tion of a take-or-pay coverage fee, such as that
sought by Tennessee Gas Pipeline in a recent
settlement agreement that would compensate it
for absorbing carrying charges on the take-or-
pay obligations it satisfies. The Commission
should also entertain proposals to establish a
standby charge that would compensate pipe-
lines for maintaining reserves and capacity suf-
ficient to serve firm customers' peak or backup
supply needs as a condition for offering those
customers firm transportation services. Such a
charge would have elements of a demand 61
